August 2005

Response to Readership

Considering Great Britain's formidable logistical problems in battling our militia and revolutionary Continental Army, how is it that a vastly inferior and outnumbered fledgling military in the 1770s and 1780s was able to defeat the world’s superpower?

Hanson:

1. As you say, distance and logistical problems aided our cause.

2. England was scared about the growing threat of the French Revolutionary movement, and, after our independence, the rise of Napoleon. This meant not only help from the French fleet, but also constant distraction for the Royal Navy.

3. The colonies, in relative terms, covered a vast expanse and were hard to garrison. The most zealous were committed to the revolution. If perhaps the majority was not, the supporters of the king were still the more passive, the detractors the more energized.

4. George Washington was a singular figure, honest, stable, and magnanimous. It is hard to envision an American victory without him.

5. The so-called Founding Fathers were all products of the Enlightenment and were able to convey to the resistance that victory meant a complete rejection of monarchy, and would lead to power in the hands of the people themselves. While the French bragged of egalitarianism and fraternity, only the American revolutionists had the know-how to translate rhetoric into deeds. And that stability was felt to a certain degree even during the war itself, and led colonials to think their efforts would neither end in an American monarchy or tribal chaos.

6. Colonists had been in America for almost two centuries and knew the country well. And while the ultimate battles were won by creating a conventional army, the irregular tactics and skirmishing of the Americans took their psychological toll on the British.

7. There were many in England that were not sure keeping the colonies was a good idea after all. The Americans did not sound like wild-eyed Frenchmen, and might, despite the anti-British rhetoric, still evolve into a pro-British, English-speaking ally. It was also felt that Canada could be saved and consolidated by concentrating on its defense and letting the more volatile Americans go.

So we had more advantages than at first meet the eye. If one wonders why we today are a different society from Canada, the U.K., or continental Europe, the answer goes back to the Revolutionary War. Without independence, there would not have been this American strain of Western civilization, and the world would have been poorer for such a loss.

1. Do America's efforts in Iraq carry a real danger of losing moral high ground and does it really matter?

2. If morality does matter for anything past its propaganda value, what non-emasculating options are there for a super-power to demonstrate real moral high ground in a world that sees them as an unbound juggernaut whose every move is a Machiavellian effort to retain its power?

Hanson: That is a good question. If your read Andrew Bacevich's edited collection on empire, The Imperial Tense, one sees a good consensus of American foreign policy experts lamenting our imperial nature and arguing mostly for multilateral cooperation with the E.U. and the U.N.

First, almost all the criticism of the United States has emanated from four sources — France, Germany, International organizations, and the UN. India and Japan do not bash the U.S. Nor does Eastern Europe or countries like Holland and Denmark, much less the English-speaking nations other than Canada.

France and Germany decry U.S. behavior because of their own failing economies (whether they blame flooding on our contribution to global warming or critique our aid to Tsunami relief), the freedom to do so in the post-Cold War world when NATO is no longer integral to their survival, and jealousy over a once grand and now lost past. As I have said in the past, they are adolescents railing at their parents, and need to be cut free to defend themselves and spend the money so that their lofty rhetoric is matched by commensurate power to meet regional problems.

The U.N. is the megaphone for dictators, Arab autocracies, and other failed states, who use their venom to garner aid or vent frustrations at their own failures.

That being said the United States need not boast of our prowess, but might better adapt a Zen-like policy of letting others step into it first.

Let Europe have a go with the Iranians to test their postmodern notion of multilateralism; and South Korea can work out something peaceful with the North without us on the DMZ.

If we are so unilateral and preemptive, perhaps we can leave the Balkans to the new European Union Defense Force. And since Mexico is among our most hostile critics, surely they would not mind shutting down the present open border and relying on their own ingenuity, rather than billions of dollars in remittances from illegal aliens working in our the United States, to salvage their economy.

So the point is both to carry a bigger stick and keep much quieter, while we work on border security, improving our military, creating an anti-missile system, trying to get our financial house in order, and becoming at last free of petroleum blackmail.

I’m wondering what you might recommend as a quick history lesson on Israel — perhaps, Dershowitz’s book, The Case for Israel? Do you have any book recommendations covering the history of the formation of Israel going back to the early years of the 20th Century, including any that might place it within the context of the broader Middle East during that time?

Hanson: There are dozens of book aside from the monumental one by Howard Sachar, A History of Israel, that I think is still the best. I do like Dershowitz’s essay. Oddly, I found that one of the most insightful books was instead a history of the 1967 war by Michael Oren—Six Days of War, which touches on questions far beyond the war.

My strict, though objective Jewish education in grade and high school taught me that Jewish philosophers and religious leadership viewed Hellenism as fatalistic and this trait was one of many differences. If this philosophy does not come down from Aristotle, Plato, or Socrates, where does it come from?

Hanson: Well tragic is a better description than fatalistic, and Greek tragic thought is best experienced through Homer and Sophocles. Plato expanded on the older Orphic/Pythagorean concept of duality, that our souls know of a better place to return to after death, and will enjoy eternity where we began. Yet our corporal existence on earth is key to determining the peace of the soul in the hereafter.  Thus the nexus of Jewish—neo-Platonist/Hellenistic debate, since they shared some common ground in the notions of a perfect monotheistic divinity. Note that the architecture of the early Christian Church and hence Catholicism today is Neo-Platonism.

But while not atheists, the Greek philosophers also drew on a rich pagan tradition that saw the world more darkly, as one in which we age rapidly, experience constant tragedy, while our dogged character remains constant and cannot be improved through money, education, or even religion.  Our will power and indomitable spirit, the Promethean and Ajaxian refusal to surrender is the real story of human kind. And often with intellectual progress comes moral regress, as education becomes a tool to explain away sin. The beauty of Hellenism is that, given all that pessimism, there is a zeal to excel, both physical and spiritually, in the short time allotted to us, since the odds are so stacked against poor humans. So live life to the fullest now, and fight against aging, illness, and the depressing aspects of human nature rather than denying them or expecting to alter them through therapy, surgery, or counseling.

Do you believe the Six-Day War in 1967 between Israel and Arab states can be another example of the West's military superiority because of instilled Western values?

Absolutely. Note that even imported Soviet weaponry (based on either Western designs, or developed in Russia though Westernized protocols of research) could not provide victory; it was poorly maintained, not utilized in the best ways, and often left behind in retreat. Israelis’ notions of command, logistics, tactics, and technology were light years ahead of their adversaries, even though the Arab forces had more capital at their disposal, sophisticated Soviet weaponry, far grater numbers, geographical advantages, and more worldwide support.

Note that after 1973 the Arabs agreed that without the Soviet Union they could not wage a conventional invasion of Israel, and so turned to terrorism exclusively, a tactic that better incorporates their strengths. It is hard to rail about “O sons of Islam, strike the infidel” when an entire Egyptian division is annihilated and thousands are seen swimming across the Suez, but it is much easier when a deranged youth blows up children on a bus in Tel Aviv.

Many are convinced that Arab citizens of Israel are second-class citizens, with no voting rights and massive restrictions on their civil liberties. What is your understanding of the status of Arab-Israelis?

Well, I am not naïve to think they are the exact equals of Israelis in terms of security, religious, and military considerations, given the fact that Israel was founded as a Jewish state and has been at war for 50 years and more with an enemy who relies on asymmetrical tactics and the terrorism of stealthy operatives in the midst of Israeli society. But I also look at the other facts: they are the only Arabs in the Middle East who freely vote and hold office. They can go right to university while Israelis must first serve in the military. And other facts also belie rhetoric: more Arabs wish to return to the Zionist entity than leave; towns on the borders demonstrate to ensure that they are on the Israeli side of the advancing fence, not walled off along with their brothers in Palestine. Note too Palestinian youth who frequent the Hebrew university in Jerusalem. Why learn under “Zionist auspices”? Is there not an Arab counterpart university on the West Bank that would draw Muslim youth, subsidized by Gulf petrodollars, and staffed by similar top-rank academics?

So once again, since Arabs in Israel are not the full equal in every sense of the word with Israelis, in the logic of the Western intellectual, that equates to “second-class” citizenship, despite the fact by any rational measure they live a life undreamed of by most on the Arab Street.

Your article “The Disenchanted American” was provocative, but what of Israel if we assume no America and no Soviet Union in the last 15 years. Would there be a greater Israel in land size than what is in place now? It seems to me that the only thing that has been holding Israel back from defeating her enemies has, in fact, been the United States — not the United Nations as many might believe.

Hanson: In the short term, you are quite right; since the result of the 1973 war without a Soviet role by week 2 would have been a catastrophic Egyptian defeat and perhaps Damascus in ruins. After the end of the Soviet nuclear threat, the United States, ironically, replaced that deterrent force with something quite different to restrain Tel-Aviv — a humanitarian argument not to use force to defeat utterly and humiliate Israel’s enemies, both for practical reasons (fear of oil and terrorists), and for ethical grounds (don’t defeat the weak).

But a greater Israel to the Jordan border with strips of Sinai would be demographically unsound, and only incorporate millions of Arabs within the Jewish citizenry, since mass expulsions would not be tolerated by the Israeli public. In the long term, Israel’s incorporation of the West Bank would have improved the standard of living for Arabs — who in turn would only hate despised Israel more for its benefactions. There are no good choices, but I like Sharon’s strategy of decapitating Hamas leaders, finishing the fence, and holding on to only those areas critical to Israeli security that are defensible and pose no demographic problems.

In the process of globalization, how do we understand the stumbling block, which, for many seems to be the Jewish presence? Consider that not only is anti-Semitism pervasive in the Muslim world, it is found in places where there has never been a significant Jewish community — like Japan. Today, many in the West and East consider Israel to be the primary obstacle to world peace. Is it useful, then, to tie a traditional anti-Semitism to the conspiratorial thinking of our “politically correct” and “postmodernists”?

Hanson: To understand anti-Semitism, go back to the Roman colonization of Judea and their frustration with a highly religious people who would not follow the canons of Roman imperial administration. After the destruction of the temple and Diaspora, Jews migrated throughout the empire and discovered that their religion was blamed for the death of Christ in a Christianizing world and that they were equated with an ethnic identity tied to a religion unlike Christianity’s inclusive proselytizing.

By the Middle Ages, statutes prohibiting them from landholding or full participation in European society were common. And yet with the changes to come in the world economy in the Renaissance, soon finance, insurance, currency trading, and transcontinental trading were now the real sources of wealth — not land.

So with great irony, the Jews often found success in previously spurned occupations, earning them envy and hatred—and influence. Given their emphasis on education and professional work, with the rise of the nation states, they found enormous success in medicine, science, and academic life—only further increasing anger at such a small but successful minority.

Particular zealots create hatred for the Jews for shifting reasons: for the Nazis they were not Aryans, but parasites who had lost World War I and were not of the German soil; for the communists they were tricky Trotskyites they had either betrayed the revolution or implemented a murderous communist Stalinism (take your pick). For the aristocrat, they are landless, rootless moneychangers who profit without grace; for the leftist hack, they are captains of commerce who create a system that oppresses the hardworking poor. For the Arab, they steal Palestine, for the Japanese they were responsible for WWII that was so disastrous for Japan. One either listens to all this, or, as in the case of the Islamicists’ grievances, realizes that it is rooted in hatred for and suspicion of a successful and proud minority that has won the wage of envy that Sikhs, Armenians, and expatriate Chinese often have as well.

We are in the most dangerous period of anti-Semitism since World War II, brought on by European appeasement of Arab hatred, and fears about oil supplies, terrorists, and Islam. But it is fool’s dream to think blaming the Jews will solve anything. A better rule: when you hear someone blame Israel or the Jews, it is usually a barometer that they have very little argument but a great deal of fear and anger.

Now most anti-Semitism that is sophisticated and insidious comes from the academic Left and is tied in with multiculturalism, and far more virulent than the old right-wing brand, since it enjoys the patina of political correctness.

I have just finished Imperial Hubris by "Anonymous", an intelligence expert on Al Qaeda, who takes issue with Bernard Lewis', Daniel Pipes' and your assessment that the Islamists hate us for "who we are" and "what we represent", rather than what the United States has "done" in the Middle East. He also breaks with "the normally astute Victor Davis Hanson" over military victory in Afghanistan, claiming that so far, it has been an illusory failure. I wonder if you might have any opinion on the book, and its overall message of honestly addressing a growing global Islamic militant insurgency, rather than "terrorist" criminal network?

Hanson: I don’t wish to enter into name-calling with the author. But I am curious why the CIA allows former employees to draw on their agency expertise and to use its prestige to promote a book during a time of war — unless it represents in some way a majority of thinking at the CIA. Second, Richard Clark and Anonymous were present at the CIA in the years leading up to September 11; apparently they had influence and input.

After 9-11 we learn it is others’ fault and not their own, though the 1998 fatwa of bin Laden spelled out explicitly the logic of September 11, and we now learn the whereabouts of M. Atta was known to members of the Clinton intelligence team. Then the Islamic gripe was our troops in Saudi Arabia and the U.N. embargo of Iraq. But then again we have heard the following also as a basis for the Islamicists’ hatred: Israel, the influence of Jews, Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor, Chechnya, the Balkans, the theft of oil and “natural resources,” Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and so on.

At some point, one either continues to try to address those “grievances” or realizes, as with the case of all adolescent minds, that they are simply pretexts for deep-seated anger, envy, and frustration at the success and confidence of others. Poor the terrorists are not. Educated they are. So their grievances are not material, but psychological. I am more worried about the Western minds who keep busy trying to find new ways of rationalizing why we are culpable in this war — as if in 1945 Americans would keep wondering whether cutting off oil and iron ore to Japan in 1940-1 didn’t provoke Tojo, or why we didn’t speak out about Versailles more strongly.

Afghanistan, given its history and culture and geographical position, is a remarkable success. Most predicted tens of thousands of our own dead and wounded, and years of Soviet-style failure. Instead, we routed the Taliban in 7 weeks, and there are million of Afghans busy trying to create a decent society, despite illiteracy, poverty, and 50 years of constant warfare. Beware of the utopian who counts good results as failure because they are not perfect outcomes.

Finally, review more recent remarks from the author about everything from Israel to the Holocaust Museum in Washington to gain some sense of his frustrations. Do a combination Google search on “Michael Scheuer” and “Jews” and I think you will witness a portrait of someone deeply troubled.

I am under the impression that hardworking Jewish people created a state with a thriving economy that Arabs now want to claim as their own. Perhaps my impression is way off the mark. What are facts on which to base opinion about U.S. foreign policy concerning Israel? Could you please recommend a book or authors that address this topic?

Hanson: It is simple. The Arabs have all the numbers, the oil, the geographical importance, and the constant threat of terrorism; Israel has only the idealism of being a successful and liberal society. It is also a human trait to be harder on friends we take for granted than enemies we fear. Anti-Semitism plays its old role to be sure.

All that being said, and rhetoric aside, note that Americans and their politicians prefer going to Israel not the Arab world, where the rule of law and the standards of Western civilization ensure that everything from their tap water to the cop on the beat are reliable. Finally, Israel is not parasitic on the West; its own science can produce its needs; almost nothing in the Arab world was created within the Arab world, even the industry to pump its oil. That fact creates a terrible sense of frustration, especially since they know to change would bring relief, but such change would be a referendum on themselves. They are not self-confident Japanese who borrow and improve without loss of face.

Bernard Lewis recently said that all of Europe would likely be an Islamic civilization by the end of the century — at the latest. If this is so, then are we likely to see a period in European history like the Thirty Years War or worse, as rival factions within the Islamic European world fight it out and a tardy opposition to radical Islam, fanned from the dying embers of a Western cultural resistance grows more desperate?

Don’t be so bleak! Lewis was correct IF Europe does not change. But look at the U.K. and Holland, for example. Both realize their civilizations are at stake and thus are enacting laws that we would never contemplate. Holland is one more murder away from even more drastic action; and if there are 2-3 more train bombings, I think the British people would begin mass deportations. Any Western country with open immigration from the Middle East is committing cultural suicide, and for all the politically correct pieties, legislators seem to know it.

Pundits and academics decry the new restrictions and chastise us for limiting students and journalists arriving from the Middle East, but few would like to live next to a madrassas or politically-active mosque. So I think Europe will wake up at the eleventh-hour and see what is at stake. We laugh at the E.U., properly so given its pretentious rhetoric. But should Europe wish, it could create a first-class military, a cohesive citizenry, and return to the forefront as a strong protector of Western liberal values. So they are facing that choice: either a confidence in the West or insidious surrender to Islamicist fanatics. I can’t believe quite yet they would do the latter. This is their struggle, and we can only watch and pray, given the fact that their disease is such that they would blame us for any medicine we gave.

Why is peace between the Israelis and Palestinians the responsibility of the U.S.?

Hanson: Well, it wasn’t before 1967 — despite the influence of the mythical Jewish lobby. But right before the conflict the Soviet arming of the Arab Baathists and Pan-Arabists made it a focus of the Cold War, along with worries about the safety of the global oil supply. France was Israel’s main source of weaponry before 1967. But after that victory, and with the secularist pro-Soviet turn of the Arab states (so much for radical Islam that ran a poor second in the 1960s and 1970s to Soviet communism and atheist Baathism), we saw Israel as both competent and a democratic outpost deserving our support.

I think the error of the Clinton era was the ostrich-in-the-sand attitude about Arafat. We dreamed the Palestinian Authority was quasi-legitimate and comparable to the Israeli Knesset. It was not! No more than a terrorist gang of extortionists (read the latest Atlantic Monthly article on Arafat), it could never be trusted to do anything other than what such gangsters always do: extort money, impoverish the people, lie about its intentions, and break commitments. Oslo was a disaster that led to thousands dead and endemic poverty on the West Bank. Historians will write that it was one of the worst failures in the history of American diplomacy, a mini-Munich of sorts.

Why do people speak of the Iraq War rather than the Iraq Front, the way they spoke of fronts in previous world wars? Is it that people view the various fronts in the War on Islamofascism as separate conflicts with unrelated adversaries?

You make an excellent point. But remember, saying that Iraq is unique and not a part of the war apparently feeds into the Western desire for self-censure and to use reason to adduce grievances that propel the enemy when in fact they are not guided by our deity Logos at all. Thus the terrorists in London, for example, cite Afghanistan and Iraq; we in contrast don’t listen, but focus only on Iraq. Some reports are that 50,000 insurgents have been killed or captured in Iraq; otherwise, many of them would be loose elsewhere. So I am baffled by the hysteria over Iraq; it is like saying we stirred the Japanese up in 1945 by invading Okinawa when in early 1942 there was hardly any loss of life in the Pacific until we went on the offensive.

Were there mistakes made by the world community when Israel was first created which engendered the subsequent violence or was the idea somewhat doomed from the beginning?

Hanson: Why such pessimism? Israel has proved to be a great success; its culture is humane and democratic, and its contributions to the world’s scientific and cultural advancement are almost inexplicable, given its small size and population.

The hatred in the Arab presses for Jews; the anti-Semitism on the rise in Europe, and intolerance from Russia to Asia illustrate why a Jewish homeland is essential. As far as the Middle East “troubles,” they are disturbing, of course. But Saddam Hussein killed more Arabs than were lost in all of Israel’s wars since 1947. The great killer of Arabs — whether Egyptians gassing Yemenis, Iraqis gassing Kurds or shooting Shiites, or Jordanians and Palestinians killing each other in the 1970s — have always been other Arabs.

We concentrate on Israel, because it is democratic and listens, writing off far worse carnage on its borders with the ethnocentric “that’s what those people always do.” Remember that the hatred of Israel is by an extension a hatred of the West in general, inasmuch as it shows that Western culture, not oil nor aid, brings wealth to a society.

No, Israel is very much a success and the world is better off for it. Remember one final thing: for all the European appeasement of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, it won them no respite, just as saving Muslims in the Balkans earned us no gratitude. These radical Islamist hate with a primordially passionate venom that cannot be appeased or reasoned with. Israel is now blamed; before it was oil; then our troops in Saudi Arabia; and on and on. The only difference now is the demise of the Soviet Union: suddenly no Arab army wishes to stage another conventional attack, given the absence of the Russian umbrella that would save them at their proverbial eleventh hour.

How much should the administration fear Hamas and Hezbollah?  What is your read on the administration’s thoughts and policies concerning these groups?

Hanson: A lot. Both are terrorist cliques occasionally masquerading as "armed wings" of otherwise "legitimate" political organizations. They hate the West, live on the principles of terror, and as theocratic zealots, cannot govern. We should shun them both. Dealing with them would be like talking to the Himmler and the SS in 1939, or thinking that Milosevic would keep his word, or that Castro was not really a communist any longer (as was said in the 1970s). They will cease to be a problem when Lebanon is secure and democratic, Iran has experienced regime change, Iraq stabilizes, and the Israelis finish the wall and let Hamas stew in its own juice, as it fights its kindred Islamic Jihad and the PA for the glorious rule of the West Bank.

I don't know the administration's private feelings about either group. But there is always enormous pressure in the State Department to "rehabilitate" such terrorists, or to write long, sophisticated white papers "proving" that they have renounced terror (recall Arafat's pledges), that they are experiencing internal strife over violence, or that they have widespread grassroots support, rather than counting on docility from a populace terrorized by and terrorized of their methods. No, both are bad news, and I would hope we would deal with neither and not buckle to the notion that there are no other alternatives. Remember that Bush was pilloried for ostracizing Arafat in his bunker; now we see that was a bold and brave move. His death is lamented by no one, though his passing has opened up new initiatives.

What journal or magazine beyond National Review would provide the best, most reliable information on national security?

Outside of specific journals devoted to topics such as democracy, realism, or international law, and geographic areas like Palestine, Israel, Russia, China, etc. there are the generic periodicals-Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy Journal etc.- in addition to the broader ones that have valuable articles-Policy Review, The New Republic, Commentary. I think it is always a good idea to glance at the extreme right (American Conservative) and left (The Nation), in addition to the longer articles abroad in the dailies and weeklies, Telegraph,  Die Zeit (translated online), Al-Ahram (translated online). etc.

Try to be systematic by reading views from the far left, right, then center, and by Europeans and Americans. For quick short reading, a lot of the blogs (eg. realclearpolitics.com) often have lists of daily op-eds.

It is good to keep up with historical journals like the American Historical Review or The Historian for background information on particular areas, thought the prose is often bad and the topic too often irrelevant. I try to also to read each week for 3-4 hours historians like Churchill, Gibbon, Thucydides, Tacitus, etc. as a reminder of good prose and generic observations about human nature that transcend the 7-day news cycle. It is important to read historians and good literature to get some perspective that our current so-called crises (Abu Ghraib, Guantanmo, bad intelligence, etc.) have parallels throughout the past.

Was the D-Day Invasion the most efficient and effective way to spearhead the Allied drive into the heart of Germany?  Yes, it was enormously complex; yes, it was the largest coordinated attack in military history; and yes, it succeeded in unleashing the full potential of Allied resources (men and materiel) against the Nazi war machine.  That said, was it the best use of those resources?  Could a drive up through the Italian peninsula, or a series of simultaneous amphibious landings from less well defended coastlines (e.g., Denmark), have achieved the same results just as fast or faster with less loss of life?  Perhaps, another way of asking this question in light of your description of Patton in The Soul of Battle is how would Patton have defeated Germany had his advice been solicited at the time of the Sicilian campaign?

I think the disasters in Italy showed how hard fighting up a mountainous peninsula could be without inspired leadership. The Northern British front at Normandy had a beeline to the Ruhr so you can see a Denmark route — besides being far harder to supply — would not have given much more advantage. The British held out opposing a cross-channel invasion until June 1944 in hopes that the Eastern Front, Italy, the bombing campaign and the end of the submarine threat might crack Germany without a frontal assault through France, one that still gave them nightmares from the era of the Somme and Verdun.

Ideally, had Patton not been demoted for the slapping incidents, he might have been given command in Italy and done far more than Clark, or alternatively, he, not Bradley, would have been the co-equal of Montgomery in Normandy as an army commander. His southern swath was the longest and hardest to supply, and was the farthest from the Ruhr, but once he got going, adjustments could have been made (e.g., cancel Market Garden) that would have given him enough supplies to cross the Rhine in August 1944. For a golden ten days of good weather, long flying hours, dry ground, and hardly any resistance at the border, Patton would have done wonders, but by October the weather, the supplies, the Germans, etc. turned against him and the moment was lost. So those slapping incidents were critical to the war, in allowing Bradley and Clark, gentlemen mediocrities, to supplant Patton, an uncouth, obnoxious authentic military genius. Given the nature of bureaucracy, it is a miracle that saviors like a Sherman or Patton ever made it to high command, in light also of their wild rantings . Both saved thousands of lives as it was.

I wonder if the separation of church and state that we now know is so vital to democracy is due in large part to the absence of a unified religious system? No Judaism, no Christianity, no Islam, and no Hinduism to bind all members into a unified culture.  The multiple gods and temples are more like a spiritual buffet.  The main idea of democracy is the agency of the individual and I feel this strongly correlates to the ancient ideal of a hero's fated role in life.

Hanson: There are lots of things going on in your question. Our classical heritage is important here. Holy men in ancient Greece and Rome were everywhere and given state accommodation, but the ancients were hardly theocratic. Whether in literature (Oedipus ordering Tiresias to leave the palace) or life (Pericles ignoring the seers and prophets), the ancient Greeks defined religion as a different sphere from politics. And of course they saw the gods as big, undying and powerful humans, prone to similar appetites and weaknesses.

Those fumes of separation between state and god were never extinguished even during the period of the state church in the Dark and Middle Ages. Now the West is defined as Christian in emphasis, but tolerant in creed, and the model is accepted almost everywhere but the Middle East which still has theocracies or at least institutionalizes religious intolerance.

I was struck by Western leaders not being able to attend the final funeral service of the Saudi king this week. Imagine if a King Abdullah was turned away at Arlington by the Secret Service while attending a funeral of a Christian U.S. President with a "I'm sorry, no Muslims and other unbelievers allowed at mass." So the West has given civilization a very valuable gift that we too often take for granted.