Questions Log::March 2006

What is your view of the book "The Real Lincoln"? It has been said the Civil War was unnecessary and the South would have reunited with the north eventually. I read a column by Mark Alexander at townhall.com and was surprised that he agreed with much of what the book has to say. There seems to be a split on the view of Lincoln, at least among conservatives. He was either the great emancipator or a sort of dictator.

Hanson: Many paleo-conservatives hate Lincoln, blaming him for the rise of big government and claiming that "states' rights," not slavery, was the real issue of the war. I get a lot of such venom from these types for articles and book chapters I wrote about William Tecumseh Sherman, who, in this weird rightwing view, was a "terrorist" and nothing more.

But thank goodness, this is a minority view to be charitable. Most accept Lincoln's genius and understand that only his rhetoric and innate intelligence saved the Union when most others would have lost it. The final grand strategy that won the war was sanctioned by Lincoln when others doubted it: have Grant hold Lee down; let Sherman run wild to the rear; and blockade the ports of the South while cutting the Confederacy off from the West.

What was the significance of the crimson cloaks worn by the Spartans? Was it perhaps to hide blood in battle or to give the appearance that Spartan warriors were always covered in blood?

Hanson: Like the polishing of the bronze shield veneers to a high sheen, the crimson cloaks helped create the aura of professionalism and awe before battle — and may well, according to contemporaries, have hidden the blood of the wounded. So I don't think the image was one of boasting of wounds, but rather of denying them. Remember the Spartans, for all their braggadocio, were also careful to hide the exact number of their battle losses, both to friends and enemies.

I recently saw a list of the ten greatest blunders of presidents in the 20th century. The most troublesome identified Lyndon B. Johnson as the culprit who tied the U.S. to South Vietnam. Certainly he made his share of bad moves in those early years, but I felt John F. Kennedy should have had the honor of tying America to Vietnam by virtue of his signing off on the CIA-backed coup against Diem and his subsequent murder. What are your comments?

Hanson: I tend to agree. Vietnam was the logical extension of the "pay any price" anti-communism of JFK. Because of both Kennedy's canonization after his assassination and the subsequent tragedy of LBJ, Camelot hacks sought post facto to create the myth that Kennedy either did not get us into Vietnam or would have gotten us out. But both his rhetoric and our presence in Vietnam suggest he felt that communism in Asia was an expansionary phenomenon and should be stopped before it engulfed the continent.

How do you envision a victory over Islamism? In the current conflict between radical Islam and the West what condition must be eliminated? And lastly, what is a responsible policy to achieve this goal?

Hanson: We will win when those in the Middle East corral the Islamists, fearful that their actions bring not merely censure to the Islamic world, but real death and destruction for any who cast their lot in with such killers. Islam must confess that its interest in the West is nearly parasitical: the Islamic street wishes to import sophisticated technology and wants practical help in everything from engineering to medicine — but rejects the very system that produces such wealth and knowledge. Polygamy, gender apartheid, religious intolerance, theocracy, dictatorship, statism, the madrassas — all that does not produce pacemakers or I-pods.

Our only hope is to insidiously undermine the nexus between Islamism and dictatorship, by promoting a third way of consensual government and freedom. This will vent much of the current frustrations that strongmen and terrorists channel against us, and ultimately foster an economy that will raise the standard of living. We don't need to see a Switzerland emerge, just something along the lines of a Turkey: a state that more or less will remain angry at the West, but provides its people opportunity and freedom, and, of course, does not threaten its neighbors.

What is your opinion of European response to Iran, which is now closer to having a nuclear capability? Do you think they will make common cause, either with us or with each other, to take military action to prevent the Iranians from getting nukes? I was baffled by the French president recently making such a firm statement about the Iranians. What do you make of that?

Hanson: We were all surprised, even though some felt that it was a calculated outburst to bolster support for maintaining the French nuclear deterrent, which is under criticism in France for its cost. But for all our shock, Chirac was at least trying to make a point perhaps: by notifying states in advance that their help for terrorists will be synonymous with their own possible destruction, he hoped to curtail a 9/11-like attack on French soil. Europe will make common cause with the Americans up to the point when sacrifice is needed and then probably triangulate with our enemies. They wouldn't like a nuclear Iran any more than we would, but if the U.S. handles the problem then they can escape Islamic outrage by ankle-biting the U.S. All that being said, the timing of Chirac's outburst was terrible: the Iranians must have sighed, "exactly, this is what nukes do — give you the advantage of deterrence and putting enemies on notice."

Is St. John's Graduate Institute in Liberal Education as amazing as it looks on paper? Frankly, my undergraduate degree prepared me for a life of slavery. I thought you could provide some insight in this matter.

Hanson: I think it is an excellent program and spent a day there in May 2002 when I delivered the graduation address. It requires a great deal of self-discipline to complete such a rigorous curriculum, and the structure of the college is quite different from most elsewhere. But from my experience talking with students, and meeting with recent graduates, I have found St. John's graduates, on average, better read and educated than those from so-called blue-chip prestigious private colleges. So yes, I have always had the highest admiration for St. John's, and the notion that the Great Books round an individual, who, equipped with main ideas of the past, can then go on to specialize in particular disciplines after graduation — rather than vice versa.

Bob Schieffer wrote "Until Voltaire, religious intolerance was thought to be a virtue. People were put to death if their religious views did not conform with those in power. Yet in one generation and in large part because of Voltaire, opinion reversed. Intolerance became a sin, not a virtue, and freedom of religion became part of the American bedrock." Is Schieffer's opinion of Voltaire's influence reasonable?

Hanson: Sort of. But Schieffer's take seems simplistic at best, and perhaps was offered off-the-cuff. The great debate over religious freedom and secularism dates back to antiquity. While Anaxagoras was hounded and Socrates condemned for supposed sacrilege, there was by the 4th century a growing tolerance for secularists and even atheists as the Epicureans illustrated; see Lucretius' Roman-era De Natura Rerum where much of the ideas of Epicurus survive and 4th-century democratic Thebes was a hotbed of Pythagoreanism that was antithetical to traditional Hellenic religion. And, of course, during the Renaissance religious tolerance began to appear in places such as Venice and Florence. The French Enlightenment marks the modern turning point, but itself drew on some 2,000 years of prior Western debate and fervor. The American Revolution was perhaps influenced as much by the British and Scottish Enlightenments as the French. Starting with the Greeks there was always this element of self-criticism and rational inquiry in the West that inevitably questioned existing religion, both in pagan and Christian times.

In considering the reaction of the Muslim world to the "Cartoon Episode," I wonder if is there any hope for the Muslim world? Is there any historical evidence that suggests that the "cultural transformation" the U.S. is trying to win is possible? On the surface we are seeing some political change; however, I am not convinced that this transformation is genuine or deeply rooted. Can you give me any hope that "good" will win and should I be angry?

Hanson: Well, we shall not see such a complete transformation in our time. But anyone who sees Kuwait, visits a Tunis restaurant, or sees certain enclaves in Egypt understands that the Arab world is parasitic on the West, and its appetites for things foreign create a great disconnect and pangs of envy and jealousy of wishing for what they cannot themselves make or create.

So the answer to the IED and cartoon jihad is more democracy and Westernization. We are winning this war, but cannot expect a tribal order of the 8th century to change over night. A great deal of our problem rests with past multiculturalism that brainwashed a lot of Americans into thinking cultures were all about the same, the U.S. being no better and often a lot worse than others. Past realpolitik bred cynicism as bin Laden used our support for dictators to gain resonance on the Arab Street.

Then came 9/11 and we took a second look at Hamas, the Pakistani mobs, the Arabs in Europe, and everyone gasps, "My god, these people are not the sort our professors and Arab dictators assured us were just the "other" but riot when they don't get their way and idolize a mass murderer."

So now we start over with the assumption that the Arab world must leave the Dark Ages of polygamy, tribalism, dictatorship, and religious intolerance and accept Western tolerance and pluralism if it is to evolve beyond a perennially second-class society fueled by envy and jealousy of what it desires on the internet and dish TV, but can never really craft itself.

My only belief is that Western liberalism will prove stronger than 8th-century primordialism, but not if we in the West don't believe in our own values.

Sixty years in pursuit of failed plans aimed at a "two-state" solution, resulting in thousands of needless Jewish casualties, has culminated in the rise of Hamas inside the doorsteps of Jerusalem. How many more diplomatic failures and/or dead and wounded would you recommend Israel endure before Israel, and her American friends, begin seriously considering the idea of a "one-state solution?" That is, Israeli sovereignty from the Jordan to the Mediterranean and the status of Arabs living therein determined by the democratically expressed will of the Israeli people.

Hanson: Your one-state solution of a Greater Israel is not going to happen, so it matters little what I think. Obviously, Israel's democratic culture attracts Arab immigrants, daily as workers, legally as immigrants, and illegally as well in numbers approaching 100,000. But make no mistake, de facto practice and public stances are two different things: so, while Arabs are currently better off economically and politically on the Israeli side of the Green Line that does not mean that the majority would still not wish to destroy Israel per se. So there will always be a demographic problem until democratic culture permeates Arab societies and allows a degree of secularization. No matter how well off Arabs are inside Israel, it is naive to think they would appreciate such a society from the Jordan to the Mediterranean.

Such a concept has no support in the United States, and probably not within Israel either. The Sharon idea to concentrate as many Israelis as possible in a defensible state was based on pragmatism and demography. One way to destroy Israel would be to make a single-state as you suggest. Oddly, your idea is often identical to that of many on the Left, who see in such a plan a way to dismantle the Jewish state, by incorporating millions of Arabs within it who in no time would constitute a majority, vote along ethnic and religious lines, and then repudiate the liberal Western traditions that have made Israel a model of success. For now, a unilateral solution of finishing the fence, giving up 95% or so of the West Bank, holding tight on the suburbs surrounding Jerusalem, and strikes at terrorist ring-leaders on the West Bank are about all we can realistically hope for until a truly democratic culture appears on the West Bank. Trying to negotiate with thugs like Arafat is paramount to suicide.

It was encouraging to read “At War With Ourselves: We're winning in Iraq. Let's not lose at home.” after the events of the last few days and the "pundit" reviews of those events. However, I am concerned about this statement:

A New York Times editorial seems to completely contradict it. In his editorial Nicholas Kristof refers to a just-released poll of 944 U.S. military in Iraq and states:

I realize that the poll was of only 944 soldiers. Kristof obviously considers it a representative sampling, and it may or may not be skewed. Even if it is skewed, it will influence those who have been criticizing the war and, as Mr. Hanson infers, who may be responsible for us losing the war "at home"

My question for Mr. Hanson: Is he aware of this poll and how does this information influence his assessment? And because it appears so contradictory to his statement — does he intend to respond to this poll?

Hanson: Yes, I am aware of that poll and zillions of others, ranging from an original 70 percent approval of the war to the current more than 40 percent. Three things to consider: first, we were not told how the 944 were selected from some 130,000 soldiers, where they were stationed, or what branch of the service they were from. We must assume that Mr. Zogby polled both front and rear eschelon troops, officers and enlisted, Marines and Air Force, those newly arrived and those departing, those with one tour and those with more, etc.

Two, all soldiers wish to come home. Had anyone interviewed soldiers in, say, Italy in 1944 there would have been a great deal of unhappiness, or especially B-17 crews circa 1942. Few soldiers at any time look beyond a year or expect to be fighting "as long as is necessary."

Three, one way of looking at the results is that over 70 percent of troops in Iraq did not want to pull out immediately. And the 72 percent who reflected a year's time simply mirror what they are being told, mostly by their own officers and politicians. The theme in Iraq is Iraqization, as 10 Iraqi divisions are formed and are reaching a readiness status thought impossible two years ago. As our own troops decline to 130,000 from 160,000, there is a natural feeling that we are being replaced by Iraqis.

I was surprised in that regard that only 70 percent said one year, since to agree with the other 23 percent about as long as is necessary might seem to cast doubt on the ability of the very people one is training. So for all the rhetoric about as long as it takes, I am sure both in Iraq and in the U.S., that there is a feeling that about 4 years, $100 billion in aid, 3 elections, and 400,000 Iraq new troops will — and should — be sufficient to finish the job and show our firmness in honoring our commitment to clean up the Iraqi mess that we have been directly involved in since 1991. Thus my statement that our soldiers think we have a plan with a definite beginning and end, and that training troops, birthing a democracy, and hunting the terrorists can allow a radically different government to survive on its own.

There seems to be a significant difference between the current conflict in Iraq and those in the past. Granted, as you point out, there is no shortage of examples of faulty or incompetent intelligence in the history of warfare. I am not aware, however, of past conflicts where intelligence services have acted in the traitorous manner evident today in the myriad leaks to the Washington Post and New York Times. Do you know of a similar, suicidal pathology by a country at war?

Hanson: I think at times in the Civil War the Copperheads in 1864 engaged in activity and disclosed information that was designed to harm the Union cause and force a stalemate that might bring them into power. In addition, there were a number of Confederate sympathizers in the government and military that were hardly careful in handling classified material. And their opposition to Lincoln also was grounded in a hatred of abolitionists and equity between the races. At times in WWII the Press hounded Patton to such an extent after Sicily that America lost its most gifted commander just when we needed him most in Italy in early 1944. And of course you remember Vietnam, when there was not merely leaks from intelligence agencies, but prominent Americans who ventured to Hanoi, lied about the terrible conditions faced by American P.O.W.s, gave propaganda lectures for the enemy, and did all they could to lose the war. My first memory as an incoming freshman at UC Santa Cruz in 1971 was walking into the dorm and seeing two Viet-Cong flags with Uncle Ho posters at the end of the hallway. So, yes, we've been here before.

My worry about our intelligence services is that so many are elites and liberal arts majors who smugly see themselves as intellectuals first and analysts in service to the U.S. government second, and thus on their own, decide what is moral and what is not, and leak accordingly out of some self-righteous sense of ethical purity. When I see a leaked C.I.A. analysis about Iran's nuclear capability or the status of jihadist terror, I don't necessarily believe it, but now first ask cui bono? And assume the agency is leaking it to embarrass the proponents of particular policies that they disagree with.

And these post facto tell-all books by former analysts confirm that they are self-important and draw selectively on their past access to make political points — most often to appease the liberal status quo that apparently provides them with a sense of sophistication and intellectual approval that they so desperately seek. A very sad and dangerous development. The only irony? Academics despise the intelligence services whose ranks so often obsequiously seek the academy's approval.

March 2006

Response to Readership